Similarity of Structure Between Interpretation & Intent
Wow! What a complex notion.

Start with speaker's intent.
Speaker chooses words from his own idiolect to "encode" his intent, and his possibly covert intent may not reflect the words he chooses. (1) In addition to his "purpose" for speaking, he may "misspeak" by choosing a word with a different dictionary definition from his intended overt "meaning". (Freudian slip, spoonerisms, hyperbole, incorrectly learned time-binding, etc.)

Boss to tardy employee: "Do you know what day it is?"

Boss's covert motive is to tell the employee he, the boss, knows that the employee is late, but he used hyperbole to extend the time frame from minutes or hours to days. Now, just suppose that the "day" in question happens to be an anniversary of some significante to (a) the boss - and the employee knows it, (b) the employee and the boss knows it, (c) the company and they both know it, (d) some other celebratory or mournable event known to one or both of the transactors. Awarenss of the context on the part of one or the other or both can influence the decoding of the word 'day' by the employee, and the employee's resulting inference as to the intent of the boss.

Factors other than context.

Different possible consistent dictionary definition sequences to which a sentence might refer based strictly on customary dictionary definitions.
Variations on these based on idiolect or idiosyncratic experiences of different individuals with different histories.
So, we have the words, (syntax) the different possible "meanings" (senses) of the words in sentences, variations on those due to idiolect, the many possible scenerios (referents) to which these could refer.

How are we to decide which of these constitutes a structure for comparison purposes?
The speakers spoken words and the listeners heard words? (Similar syntax?) Who is able to compare a speakers spoken words to a listener's heard words?
Not me, because I'm another listener.
Not you, because you are another listener.
Neither of us can hear the speaker's spoken words. We can only hear our own heard words.
Moreover, one of us cannot "hear" what another listener "heard", so none of us can even compare our own heard words to someone else's heard words.
As they say in all those directions jokes, "Hmmm., I believe you can't get there from here."

We don't know what structures to compare.
We cannot get to any structures other than our own, so we couldn't compare our own struture to another's, even if we could know what structures to compare.

We have to infer and decide what to use for comparison - the formulations, or our guess as to what the formulations might refer to. This later poses its own additional problem, because even if we knew what formulation to use, we would have the problem of the hypothetical and likely difference between our own referential association to the formulation and the unknown refferential association of the speaker. As the listener, we don't know the speakers referential associations for words; we only know our own, and there are many. We are left with picking out one or more of our own refferentials associations for words and hypothesizing that the speaker may be using one of those. Since the speaker may have other different from us refferential associations, it follows that the refferential associations we pick from among our own to hypothesize may be among the speaker's choices may not even include the one the speaker may have been using to select his or her words. And this is without even taking possibly covert encoding into consideration.

endeavoring to achieve similarity of structure between listener interpretation and speaker meaning/intent?

We have no direct access to the speaker's meaning/intent; we can only infer, guess, judge, hypothesize, etc., based on our own experience with meanings and intents, a supposed meaning/intent of the speaker, and that, just happens to be our (the listener's) interpretation.

What we can do is endeavoring to achieve similarity of structure between the listener interpretation and the listener's hypothetical inference or interpretation of the speaker's meaning/intent.

Wait a minute...?!?

Endeavor to achieve "similarity of structure" between the listener's interpretation and the listener's interpretation of the speaker's intent? What's the difference here?

In order for these to be different, we have to get rid of the second "listener's interpretati", and the only way to do that is to assume (false to fact) that the lisener has some way to get outside of his own semantic reactions and interpretations as to what the speakers words mean and somehow get some direct access to the speaker's meaning/intent. But this is not possible, because we abstract from what we heard into our own (listener's) interpretations. This is not to say that we cannot arrive at multiple listener's interpretations, and then choose between them or seek to decide on the basis of further transactions, but in all cases we are reacting to our own listener's interpretations. We simply have no way to get outside our own abstractings.

It is a "realist" perspective that presumes there is an external to all observes "fact of the matter", and that there is some way independent of all observers to measure the differences in said presumed "existing" structures of the presumed to exist speaker's meaning/intent and the equally presumed to exist listener's interpretation.

The omniscient "God's eye view" is presumed to have direct access to the structure of the speaker's meaning/intent and the structure of the listener's interpretation.

None of us practicing general semanticists have that view. A listener cannot know what the speaker's meaning/intent "is" or what its "structure" "is like". This is because the listener hears words, interprets them based on his or her experiences (not the experiences of the speaker) and this amounts to the listener's interpretation. Even a third party who is a full confidant of both the original speaker and listener can only have his or her own "listener's interperation" of the speaker's word/meaning/intent.

Yes, Thomas, It's amazing that we manage to communicate at all - if we ever do...

I suspect that the "edge" comes from mirror neurons, the job of which, it seems to me, is to map observations of others' actions to our own motor neuron processes at a level prior to actual commitment to action. That means that our brains (and the brains of other advanced species) must have "recognition structures" that become active when the salient features that differentiate own species from other species as well as abstract features of the actions of such "recognized" others of own species and map those features to own nerulogical recognition of own structures and action sequences. It's become more and more likely that we "understand" something in neurological terms of the activation of neuro-muscular activation that enables us to do something related to surviving.

General semantics bibliographic material handed out by Charlotte Read include reference to the early work of Nina Bull, who found correlations to body "motor attitudes" and "emotions" and published research in the "attitude theory of emotion". As early as 1948 she recognized that thinking and feeling were tied together with motor neuron activity. Current work corroborates that early research.

This means that we have specialized nurological circuits that allow us to become very good at looking at another person looking at something, and with our mirror neurons, turn and unerringly look right at what the other person was looking at. The survival value is that when a competitor looks at food nearer to me, I can get to the food before he does. If we couple that ability with the correlations between lip, tongue, throat, etc., movements, and sounds heard and made, we can understand some basic words in neurological terms of the actions that allow us to understand how to use our bodies to implement the associated responses, whether we execute the final command and actually do something or whether we stop short of that action.

Works fine for "give" "stop" "go" "come" and other simple commands. See my post here. Once we have a few basic recognition capabilities that evolution has provided us with, such as being able to identify a possible mate, chase away a maurading competitor, dominate other competitors, etc., we have the basis of a neurological "defining" capability, provided by evolution, for "same".

So I look up words in the history of my experiences first, in the dictionary second, in technical writings third, ask questions of the users forth, and other analyses as appropriate, and I "assume", subject to correction, a first pass meaning and intent (create a map), which gets continually updated based on subsequent transactions. Even "thinking outside the box" depends on my own experience, which, as "On Intelligence" shows, generally gets better as time goes on.

In old movies about the British in India, a Brit questions an Indian man as to why he works towards some end if he believes that the future is ordained - pre-determined. The Brit does not understand working towards something if one believes that the future is pre-ordained - the Indian perspective depicted in the film.

So, to answer your implied question. I don't stop talking just because I have no certainty with respect to communication. I work not towards getting "the" structure of my interpretation to be "similar to" "the" structure of the speaker's "intent/meaning"; I work for coherence in my understanding of the sequence of my interpretations of what I heard, coherence that include my mirror neurons providing a sense of reward.

David wrote, > The omniscient "God's eye view" is presumed to have direct access to the structure of the speaker's meaning/intent and the structure of the listener's interpretation. <

Wow! Where did that come from? After reading that I wonder if we are even talking about the same subject? Hmmm... I could be wrong, but I think you might have just given us a good demonstration of the phennomena Irving J. Lee referred to as "by-passing".

"By-passing", as defined by Lee, is not related to the metaphysical "God's eye view". "By-passing is when the listener directly assumes that the speaker meant what the listener would have meant had the listener spoken the same words in the same situation. It presumes that the listener has little or no consciousness of abstracting, and is not considering any alternative possible interpretations. There is a big difference between "jumping right to an assumption" and deciding after delayed reactions and deeper analysis of the preceeding communications as to how to interpret the speaker's words. It is quite possible the listener may eventually arive at the same formulation as the "initial reaction" the "by-passing" assumption or "signal reaction" provoked. "By-passing", it seems to me, means "by-passing consciousness of abstraction, delayed reaction, and analysis" and going right to the initial semantic reaction. Ultimately the listener comes to his interpretation, but it can be anything ranging from a near instantaneous signal raction to an extended delayed analysis and symbol response.

The "omniscient" "God's eye view" has the property that "God" is supposed to be able to know exactly without being bothered by epistemological questions of how He knows. You might think that this is "by-passing" "His" abstraction process, but that is a misunderstanding of the notion of "omniscient" (all-knowing).

Did you mean something different?

David,
In your previous post, you quoted my "God's eye view comment", and you then wrote of bypassing. I responded to your comment following that quote. I even linked to the same source that your earlier link was to. Were you not talking about what you quoted? How did you intend "by-passing" to apply to your quote of my "God's eye view" comment?

There is neither "by-passing" nor "abstracting" involved in "God's knowledge" ("God's eye view") as the definition means "all-knowing" and "all-perfect".

I like to refer to the "God's eye view" when somebody suggests that we can compare structure without including the abstraction process from any putative strutures all the way to the single brain doing the comparison. If he or she leaves out the abstracting process in the description of the comparison, he or she implicitly uses the ludicrous "God's eye view" perspective.

An example is the opening post which leaves out the abstracting process by which one can come to the speaker's intent/meaning.

To "move" in the direction of similarity of structure between two putative structures, one must have a way of comparing the structures so as to measure the degree of similarity. In order to achieve that, one must be able to abstract characteristics from each of the structures in question. Presuming that one has the capability to alter one structure, then one must subsequently abstract separately from both structures to object and verbal levels and compare or measure the differences in the abstractions and (hopefully) finding that measured difference smaller than previously.

In this case the structures are the "intent/meaning" of the speaker and the "interpretation" of the listener. So the process is to abstract from the intent/meaning of the speaker, which we do by bringing the listener's experiences to the heard or read words and interpreting the words in light of the listener's experiences.

On the other hand, the listener abstracts from heard speakers words bringing the listener's experiences to bear in order to form the "listener's interpretation".

In both case we have the speakers words as heard and understood through the listener's eyes and experiences - in other words, the listener's interpretation.

How is the listener to get to the speakers intent/meaning without first having gone through the abstracting process? Well, if you don't mention the abstraction process, then the "God's eye view" is presumed by virtue of the language structure - (Crazy talk, Stupid talk).

When one reads or hears the speakers words, the above applies. If the listener has questions, he can ask for more words, and the process above is repeated.

In a cycle of many repitions, as implied in Talk, some convergence is possible, at each unidirectional transaction in the process, the above applies. One can strive to reduce the amount of formulations that are not agreed to, and this we can measure. Even a third party can measure by abstracting from the record of the conversation. But that involves one brain abstracting from the words of each of the two speakers, each in turn, and that process is also subject to the above reader interpretation through abstraction.

David wrote: Ralph, as I understand it, the interogtive is the sentence function we use when endeavoring to achieve similarity of structure between interpretation and intended meaning. Where do "Sentence" and "Ask" fit into your "Talk" model?

In the talk model "say" = {"declare"|"command"|"question"}, and it can be any "utterance" whether it is a complete sentence or a fragment, including "rhetorical" questions or any other verbal utterance, as well as non-verbal gestures that function as symbols.

Note, that when you mentioned "interrogative" abowe, you are presuming a prior transaction in which the original speaker has already uttered something. At this point the prior listener becomes the new speaker and starts the process again. You are speaking of a repetitive sequence of many transactions, each following the talk model.

It's important to differentiate such a sequence from the structure of a single one-way transaction so that the structure that is involved in each single one-way "communication" is understood prior to considering the effect of feedback on model building based on a continuing sequence of single transactions.

To achieve or approach greater "similarity" of structure between the "speaker's intent" and the "listener's interpretation" is what you claim.

Begin with a single transaction in one event from one speaker to one listener.

Look at that single transaction process with the following questions.
1. Who is to measure the difference between the speaker's intent and the listener's interpretation?
2. How is the information used to measure the difference to be obtained?
3. What is the abstraction process at each step in the one transaction?
3a. What is the abstraction process by whom at each step in the one transaction.

Remember - one speaker speaking to one listener who is NOT YET replying, because that involves a second transaction.

In my previous posts I assume that the point of view to be taken is that of the listener.

Whatever answers above then apply each time the speaker and listener reverse roles for subsequent transactions.

Finally we can talk about the result of an extended sequence of such transactions.

David, when you talk about asking a clarifying question rather than assuming that you know what the speaker meant, you are speaking from the perspective of the listener who has heard something for which he has an uncertainty about the speaker's intent/meaning.

Most of your discussion in this thread seems to have been about a continuing set of transactions involving more than one simple communication. In such a sequence the meaning of "speaker" and "listener" becomes ambiguous because these roles reverse with each single transaction. I have been very precise in using "speaker" and "listener" in a single transaction sense, and indicating that the roles reverse when the first listener becomes the second speaker. So a question that is asked in order to clarify the understanding the listener had is now asked and that asker becomes the speaker for that follow-up question transaction. That is why I infer that your interrogative refers to a prior communication.

However, that does not preclude the speaker from asking a question out of the blue, such as when a bar-hopper asks a likely suspect, "Do you come here often?" This is a single transaction from a speaker to a listener. The addressed person then becomes the speaker and the original questioner becomes the listener when the likely suspect accepts or rejects the pick-up line.

This structure is consistently using the terms 'speaker' and 'listener' univocally rather than as a "rigid designator" for the person who spoke first and the person who was originally addressed. If we are to have a clear communications model we must use such terms univocally. If we use such terms in other than a univocal manner in a model definition or description, we introduce ambiguity.

Who is the speaker? The one speaking now. The role reversal also applies to 'writer' and 'reader'.

I can now see that many of your reponses to me have been because you seem to have been using the terms 'speaker' and 'listener' as rigid designators for the person who spoke first and the person spoken to first, and you have the "listener" asking questions - a non-univocal use of the term 'listener'.

Such reversals are not consistent with my univocal use, and likely accounts for a good portion of our "talking past" one another. I'm sorry I did not pick up on this in the very beginning. It might have saved some confusion.

Thomas wrote, But if one asks "what do you mean?" the sarcasm can be defused and maybe 'true' communication may begin.

From the perspective of TA an A-A response to a C-P or C-A constitutes a "crossed transaction", which is not likely to resolve the issue. The "sarcastic" CP response (laying guilt on the child) given constitutes a "parallel transaction" keeping the participants in the same roles. A NP response, also a parallel transaction, would keep the participants in the same roles, but might be more likely to lead to resolution. Direct questions, such as "what do you mean?" generally constitute A-A transactions. According to TA "crossed transactions" do not lead to resolution.

I bring this in because the analysis of communication based on one or two sentences represents a high level abstraction that leaves out a significant contributor to "meaning", namely the context and history.

The "ethic" of asking clarifying questions in an "adult-adult" manner should not be applied rigidly in all circumstance.

David wrote, I think the problem has to do with use of declaratives where interrogatives would seem to be more conducive to the goal of communication.

For example: utterances with "are you ... ?" instead of "you are ... ." can help one avoid unintentional attributions of meaning or intent. This, in turn, can prevent "by-passing" and help people in their efforts to achieve similarity of structure between interpretation and intent.

I think the key here is in the "I think ... would seem ["to me"]...". This has to be a judgement call on the part of whomever is listening at the time. And I'm quite certain that whomever is speaking at the time may disagree with the respondent's choice to declare their interpretation rather than ask if that interpretation is "correct".

If you want to say to me, "I think you should have asked.", you are free to do so. But I am also free to feel that it's my right to say that "I think you ...". This, it seems to me, is a matter of choice and style. If I say I think you meant.." you are free to say, "No, I meant ...".

I do not think that there is an objective "fact of the matter" as to which approach "is" better or "has better results". Conduct a study and find out - in limited circumstances under controlled conditions and it may not apply generally. Has such as study been conducted?

By "better" we normally mean a comparative judgement call which may or may not have objective data to support it.

I personally think it more efficient in overall communication to proceed with the consciousness of abstraction that allows one to be aware of making assumptions and being prepared for them to be wrong - a general semantics principle.

We don't need a lot of "is that what you meant" followed by "right" or "close enough" adding noise to the overlall process.

You, of course, may disagree.

This whole repeated theme reminds me of Gulliver's Travels. Royal personages have in their employ "flappers" whose duty it is to flap the ears and mouth of the royal person when, in the opinion of the flapper, it time for the royal personage to listen or to speak.

When can it be appropriate for the first speaker to decide when it is appropriate for the first listener to declare or to question? It certainly cannot be prior to the first speaker, now the second listener, hearing the response of the person spoken to - now the second speaker.

Deciding that the first listener, now the second speaker, "should have" in the opinion of the first speaker, now the second listener, asked a question rather than make a declarative statement represents a judgement by the first speaker, now the second listener, after evaluating the response of the first listener, now the second speaker.

Said judgement can only arise after the second listener has compared his interpretation of the second speaker's response to his own (first speaker's) original statement, and further made a judgement that the first listener did not understand what he, the first speaker said. How is the second listener in this case not obligated himself to question the second speaker to confirm that his interpretation of the response itself does not itself need a clarifying question?

By symmetry we have:
A: Statement.
B: Question about statement.
A. Question about question about statement.
B Question about question about question about statement.
A. Etc.
B. Etc.

Nether A nor B can be the "controller" of the communication sequence, so each has, by your process, the "right" to "demand" that the other ask clarifying question rather than present their intepretation prior to proceeding.

What criteria shall we use for deciding when to ask a question? Who has the responsibility for applying that criteria? Any such criteria must be symmetrically applied to both participants.

David referenced his post in which he wrote 3. We determine that the other person's view is dissimilar to our personal view, and is not correct.

I can understand constructing a model of another person's view and comparing it to one's own view and determining that these views differ. But I do not understand how "correct" can be applied in such a case. In fact, I do not see how "correct" can be applied in all three cases 1-3.

What can it mean for a view to be "correct"?
Using the map-territory analogy it would have to mean that the map matches the territory. In thoses cases we have the view of the listener's map, and we have the hypothesized map the listener has constructed as representing his or her interpretation of and speaker's map (view).

The listener cannot know that his map is "correct", because he or she has no independent way of getting to the territory; he or she only has his or her map. Nor can anyone else, as they do not have access to the "territory". Now, if you are talking about mathematics and other symbol systems in which the syntax is completely specified, then there is a method for "proving" some statements "true" using valid rules of inference. But this process is not available for ordinary semantic language use.

By similar reasoning the listener cannot determine if his or her construct of the speaker's view matches its territory; nor, incidentally, can anyone else, because of the abstraction and construction process involved. Again, except in the rare case the discussion is strictly about logic and mathematics - syntax - language without semantic content.

This brings me back to your original post to see where "correctness" comes in. You wrote - Once we have constructed our rendition of their view, we compare that rendition with our personal view and evaluate for correctness.[emphasis mine].

We can compare the views, but comparing "for correctness" means comparing to some external "reality" or "standard" or "the TRUTH" or etc.

I would say that "for correctness" must be removed from the entire post in order to bring it more in line with general semantics.


In this case, "intent" refers to the speakers intended meaning for a particular utterance. It does not refer to the evolving body of shared meaning that emerges from an ongoing dialogue.

Consider this description:
- When we share our views with another person, we speak/write a composition that serves as a map of our view of a "territory".
- When we listen/read, we interpret the other person's composition and construct our own rendition of their view of a "territory".
- Once we have constructed our rendition of their view, we compare that rendition with our personal view and evaluate for correctness.

From this comparison, it seems like there are four [three] possible outcomes:
1. We determine that the other person's view is similar to our personal view, and is correct
2. We determine that the other person's view is dissimilar to our personal view, but may still be correct
3. We determine that the other person's view is dissimilar to our personal view, and is not correct
4. We determine that we don't have enough information to construct a coherent rendition of the other person's view

It seems to me that outcomes 3 and 4 could serve as a good indicators that our initial interpretation may be different than the other person's intent,

At 2 we have our own view, we have our constructed interpetation or map of the other's view, and we have a comparative evaluation that they are different. But we don't have a reason to suspect, without further processing, that our constructed interpretation does not map the other person's view. We don't have his or her view itself; that's the territory. We only have our map of his or her view. We can analyze that map, and if that map seems consistent with our experiences of other conversations and stuff, why would we think that our constructed map is "wrong"? - other than for the simple general semantics consciousness of abstracting that we know that it, our constructed map of the other person's view, is abstracted and not the territory, a situation that applies to every map we construct and apprehend.

Without further feedback transactions one can not discover errors in a map; we have to use a map to discover errors in it. Consequently, on the basis of listening to one statement by a speaker, we the listener, conscious of abstracting, realize that our "understanding" of the speaker is our constructed map of his or her view. Because of consciousness of abstracting we know that our constructed understandnig is a map -and, recalling that no map is its territory, we also know that is may have errors. But, the simple fact that that map differs from our own map does not enable us to say that it, or even our own, is "incorrect" or "correct". We are left with our own map, our constructed map of the speaker's view, and that they differ. Until we use the constructed map, such as by speaking or writing from it, we won't discover that the original speaker disagrees with his or her interpretation of our interpretation of his memory of his original intent.

Continuing with 3' and before we proceed with disagreeing or correcting [with] their view, etc, we should probably ask some clarifying questions to ensure there is indeed some semblance of similarity between our interpreted rendition & their original intent.

Well, if we don't have a coherent constructed interpretation of the speaker's view, then asking for clarification is wholly appropriate.

But it is also a possibility that the lister can formulate and present his view as showing what he does understand.

Let me return to your sequence for a moment. If we were not able to construct a coherent map of our interpretation of the speaker's view, we would most likely similary not have our own constructed in response coherent view, although the incoherence in our understanding may stimulate some related or unrelated responess.

We have the option of formulating and presenting, as a response, some of our reactions, thus allowing the original speaker and opportunity to add formulations. But that goes beyond the scope of your "particular utterance" limit.

Now, it may be the case that when the original speaker reads any response by the original listener, whether the listener "understood" or not, he may be just as likely to "err" in his mapping of the original listener's intent in his or her response. He or she may also judged about the original listener, "You should have asked a clarifiying question.", [because my evaluation of my interpration of your response to your interpretation of my memory of my original intent is that you did not understand what my memory of my intent is].

Otherwise, we risk commitng "by-passing" as described by Irving J. Lee and Neil Postman. For more details, see the "By-passing" section at: http://lightmillennium.org/2007_20th/mlevinson_crazy_talk.html

I would like to see more of Lee's original writing to explain what he means by "by-passing" other than the "consise" definition presented in the on-line citations - they may be second order reformulated abstractions, and may have left out something important.

I think it rare that our response would be like Fish's in Barney Miller, "My words, exactly."

Hi David,

I'd still like to see what Lee had to say in amplification of what he meant by "by-passing". It seems to me that the on-line quotes are too "pat", and they don't contain any good examples or discussion. They seem to be overly precise second or third order abstractions. Do you have the original reference to Lee's source? Not a secondary reference that does not cite the original source.

In the example provided in Levinson, by-passing takes the listener to evaluating whether he or she agrees when the speaker said, "I love you.". If you think about this for a bit, "agreement" (or not) fails to apply, because we would not be evaluating if the speaker meant the same thing as we would. The example is far to abstract to be a useful example. It's an overly simplified concept - a sound bite that too patently easy to swallow, hook, line, and sinker.

I don't particulary like the word 'specious' because of its connotations of "nefarious motive".

If I'm suspicious about a person's motive, I give them the benefit of the doubt by not assuming nefarious motives.

I would not use "is specious" or "is non-sense" in either case, as they externalize and objectify one's judgement as a "property" of some reified thing.

If my inital reaction is that something somebody says does not make sense, I go into analysis mode and seek to consciously vary the senses of the terms and their combinations taking into consideration my past experience with this person. If that still leaves me with "Huh?", I have multiple options, one of which is to ask questions, another of which is to present my reasons for seeing the statement as "not making sense".

I also try to take a person's statements at face value, and that can sometimes produce a "literal" response that does not answer the intent.
Example.
Q: Do you have the time. A. Yes.
Q: Can you tell me the time: A: Yes.
Q: Would you tell me the time. A: Yes.

Motive behind a statement or inference is usually not the same as the formulation stated or asked. I make it a habit not to speak to "inferred" motives, but to speak to the formulation stated or asked. I have the formulation; I do not have the motive. The same applies to "meaning". I have the formulation; I do not have the person's "meaning" that he or she chose this formulation to express. I deal with the formulation using the following in order of priority.

1. Dictionary definition as understood by my history.
2. If at all uncertain, look up the time-binding record and conform to that.
3. Use the context to disambiguate among the previous.
4. Adjust for technical context.
5. Adjust for any "private joke" special understandings.
6. Adjust for prior usage differences with the current audience.

I believe these steps should be considered "due dilligence".

Without further citations and review of Lee's original work, I cannot infer that you mean anything different than the citations you have provided. Can you provide a couple of more examples of "by-passing"? Preferrably ones that do not use such high level abstractions as "love".

As a simplified and overly abstract description a speaker says something. The listener hears those words and thinks, yes, that is what I would have said were I in the same situation. Ok. I understand exactly what you meant. Now I can tell you that I (dis)agree (and I will say why you are wrong).

There's no mention of consciousness of abstracting, no mention of considering alternatives in the process of evaluating what one infers the other person said, and there's no mention of the abstracting involved.

If one, in ones considered opinion, after thinking about what one understood of another person's speech (presuming up-and-up adult-adult scientist-like motives on both parts) has reason to believe the other person's view as understood does not model the situation under discussion. Providing feedback ("challenge" has too many unfortunate connotations) to illustrate the perceived (by the evaluator) flaws or inadequacies and how he or she see them "de-flawed" or made adequate seems appropriate to me.

David, If you don't like the "love" example in the secondary reference for Lee's (intensional) "definition" of "by-passing", how is it that you think you can correctly apply the term in his sense? Do you think you understand what Lee meant and how to apply it on the basis of that secondary source?

You quoted (whom?) "And so we have here a sort of paradox. On the one hand, we must naturally assume that others are using words to mean what we would, and that such meanings have some stability. But on the other hand, we must remember that this is only an assumption, that at any given moment a coin of the realm may not be worth what we imagined. And, naturally, our purposes will be short-changed."

This so-called "paradox", it seem to me, marks the "boundary" between using and not using consciousness of abstracting.

You keep coming back to asking questions.

Here's what it sound like to me.

You think I should have asked a question after you have read what I said. Moreover, you have said many times essentially that "asking questions is the way to go". I have heard this many times, and I have countered with that asking questions is not the only alternative.

You also appear to be "labeling" (but not in so many words) my not asking questions as "by-passing" and by association exhibiting "stupidity".

Is that your intent? Are you trying to get me to ask questions when you think I should?

I think that "achieving similarity of structure between interpretation and intent" is too abstract a formulation to be measurable.

It needs to be fleshed out with extensional measuring points and show each abstraction process involved, as well as which agent is evaluating the different and how.

Start with each term.
Intent. How is it measured?
Interpretation. How is it measured.

How is any "structure" of intent to be measured?
How is any "structure" of interpretation to be measured?

Who is to do the measuring in each case, and who is to compare the measures.

I assume that achieving "similarity of structure" can be evaluated by means of reducing the value of a difference between the measures of each to an "acceptable low level".

How else would you evaluate similarity of structure?

achieving similarity of structure between interpretation and intent

Who's intent? - The speaker's.
Who's interpretation? - The listener.

A "transaction" consists of a "speaker" saying something_spoken and a listener hearing somenthing_heard. We usually pesume that the somenthing_heard "is the same as" the something_spoken, but we must remember that in a medium of transmission in a context noise can result in that not being the case. Moreover, due to accents, speech impediments, hearing difficulties, cultural differences, etc, the spoken word may be misheard by the listener.

Speaker and listener are both univocal terms, consquently these roles reverse when a second transaction takes place. Any anysis of the situation must differentiate between a single transaction and a sequence of transactions.

achieving similarity of structure between [the listener's] interpretation and [the speaker's] intent

What can we mean by "similarity of structure between two items? We have to distribute "structure" to the respective items and evaluate the of the resulting composite items.

This becomes:
achieving similarity between [the structure of the listener's] interpretation and [the structure of the speaker's] intent

Now we have to examine "the structure of" two items and compare them in order to determine that "similarity" "is" "achieved".

Since "similarity" is not an "all or none" condition, we will be left with some "degree of similarity". The word 'achieve' means getting to a goal or a result. In this context "achieving similarity" must be interpreted as achieving a sufficient degree of similarity, and that necessitates some comparative measure so that "more" or "less" similarity can be evaluated.

This becomes:
achieving [a sufficiently high measure of]similarity between [the structure of the listener's] interpretation and [the structure of the speaker's] intent


What "is" intent? See define:intent In a general semantics content, where does it reside? How can we "get at" its structure? Intent, in a general semantics content, is indicated by pointing at the object level of the structural differential. "Intent" is internal to the person. In this case, the speaker's "intent" (whatever it "is") "is" internal to the speaker. As such only the speaker knows or has direct access to it. Only the speaker can "get at" "the structure of" his or her intent.

So neither "intent" nor "the structure of intent" can be observed, measured, "got at", etc., by anyone other than the speaker.

What "is" interpretation? See define:interpretation In a general semantics content, where does it reside? How can we "get at" its structure? Iterpretation, in a general semantics content, is indicated by pointing at the object level of the structural differential. "Interpretation" is internal to the person. In this case, the listener's "interpretation" (whatever it "is") "is" internal to the listener. As such only the listener knows or has direct access to it. Only the listener can "get at" "the structure of" his or her interpretation.

So neither "interpretation" nor "the structure of interpretation" can be observed, measured, "got at", etc., by anyone other than the listener.

We are left with two items which are internal to different people, and neither can access the item of the other in any direct way, aside from the fact that we have not even talked about what "the structure of" these items might be.

Since the context is communication, we need to do two things. We need to map both of these items to something that one person can compare. That require abstraction or mapping. Only the speaker can abstract his intent to something another person might have direct or indirect access to.
Similarly, only the listener can abstract his interpretation to something that another person might have direct or indirect access to.

We have two persons involved in a single transaction, so we can chose the speaker or the listener. By the grammatical structure of the original formulation we may infer that it is the listener who is being charged with the responsibility of achieving similarity, consequently our only workable choice is to choose the listener as the person to do the evaluating.

To review, we had:
achieving [a sufficiently high measure of]similarity between [the structure of the listener's] interpretation and [the structure of the speaker's] intent

Factoring in the lister's task,
achieving [a sufficiently high measure of]similarity between [the structure of the listener's] interpretation and [the structure of the speaker's] intent [as evaluated by the litener]

Only the speaker has direct access to his intent, consequently only the speaker can abstract or map his intent.

Recall that the speaker has spoken some words. Behind that speaking we infer he or she had his or her intent for speaking those words.

We have two cases:
The speakers words, as abstracted by the speaker, corresponded to his or her intent - these words represent the speaker's intent. - in a straight forward communications.

Alternatively, the speaker had another intent in choosing his or her words, and the words do not effectivily encode or represent his or her intent.

(In a bar, "Do you have the time?" often does not indicate a desire to learn the time.)

Recall that we are still dealing with a single transaction, so the speaker's words are the only indication or mapping available of the speaker's intent (or its structure)

achieving [a sufficiently high measure of]similarity between [the structure of the listener's] interpretation and [the structure of the speaker's] intent [as evaluated by the litener]

The listener does not have accesss to "the structure of the speaker's intent", so he or she cannot compare it. What does he or she actually have?

Consider the process.

Speaker's intent abstracted by speaker to words, transmitted through a noisy medium, heard or misheard by the listener evoking his or her semantic reaction further abstracted to a structural map.

Listeners structural map abstraction of(

listener's semantic reaction to(

listeners heard words of(

speakers spoken words of(

speakers abstraction of(

speaker's intent

)

)

)

)

listener's interpretation of(

listeners heard words of(

speakers spoken words of(

speakers abstraction of(

speaker's intent

)

)

)

)

David,
Please note the process between two people described beginning with "A = first speaker; B = Respondent." and ending with "A evaluates his or her hearing of B's response as consistent with his or her remembered intent (not necessarily that B understand) or not."

You wrote, - When it comes to the social sciences, we formulate and ask questions which can confirm or disconfirm our understanding of another's intent

Much to abstract. It leaves out abstrating, and is therefore, in your words, "specious".

- When it comes to the social sciences, we formulate and ask questions [our interpretation of our abstraction of the answer to] which can confirm or disconfirm our understanding of [our interpretation of our abstraction of our hearing of the formulation of the abstraction of] another's intent

We also have other options than asking questions.

The history of general semantics, as I have understood and experienced it through several semenars, conferences, and writings all has has one thing that relates to the basic suggestion of this topic. We are expected to be extensional, and one of the ways of doing that is NOT to talk about thoughts, concepts, etc., which includes both "intent" and "interpretation". Instead we are expected to be extensional and talk about formulations.

The premise of this thread is contrary to the basic principles of general semantics. Nobody can compare or apprehend any thing or structure at another person's object level. We can only deal with formulations that they emit, and those are at verbal levels. Consequently, seeking to achieve similarity of structure between one person's "intent" and another person's "interpretation" is a disguised holdover from Cartesion dualism, Platonic ideals, and Aristotelian "essences". I have attempted to illustrate that by showing that the only access we have to such intensional and hidden "variables" which are "internal" to persons can only be accessed through abstractions to the verbal level.

Going back to Lee's definition; it uses these Cartesion, Platonic, Aristotetlian, notions of "meanings" as if they exist outside of people.
It shows a primitive and inadequate understanding of general semantics if taken seriously. I suspect, however, it is Lee's attempt to communicate in language more accessible to the general public. As such it completely eliminates a critical factor in general semantics - consciousness of abstracting. No notions presumably represented internally to people's brains can be directly observed; they can only be mapped by abstractions to verbaly levels by the individuals in whose brains they "exist", and an abstraction is a map that is not it's territory. Words are NOT neural structure activities.

Striving to achieve similarity of structure between [a neural representation in the brain of a listener] his interpretation and [a neural representation in the brain of a speaker] his intent shows the futility of the supposition.

Define "intent" in formulations that make it measurable..
Define "interpretation" in formulations that make it measurable.

It cannot be done, because "intent" is not the language in which it is expressed, as "intent" is an object level process while formulations are verbal. The same is true of "interpretation"; "interpretation" is an object level process while formulations are verbal. Object level responses are only comparable if they are in the same brain. The listener and the speaker do not have the same brain.

The only thing we can do is formulate and reforumalate in the form of both statements and questions. Each person can only compare his or her memory of formulating to his or her abstraction from what he or she is hearing.

No one can compare what is internal to himself (interpretation) to what is internal to another (intent). The fully extensional general semanticist would not dream of trying; he or she would deal with formulations and observed behavior, and recognize that any "guess" at anothers "motive" is his own interpretation of formulations and behavior.

Ben, you did not provide a way to define "intent" or "interpretation" as a measurable formulation; you merely provided an example. Moreover you did not show an "intent" or an "interpretation", you merely showed an alternative formulation, and "called" it an "intent" or "interpretation". Intents and interpretations, being internal to people's brains at the object level, ARE NOT any formulations you write. You have "identified" the symbolic formulation "1+1=2" with your internal cognitive "thought", "intent", "meaning", etc., all of which do not exist external to your brain. You cannot "show" an "intent", you can only abstract from it to the verbal level and show resulting formulation.

David wrote I can agree that here is no possibility of direct comparison of intent to interpretation, but I don't see why that is relevant.

It is relevant because the topic formulation that asks that we strive to achieve similarity of structure betwen these two (intent and interpretation) implicitly and falsely presumes that we can.

An analogy from physics is that you are using a Newtonian paradigm; I am talking relativity. You are presuming simultaneous relation between two without applying the necessary relativistic transformation equations from the one coordinate system to the others. You are presuming both are in the same coordinate system if you think the listener can compare his interpretation to the intent of the speaker without applying the necessary relativity transformation - namely the speaker abstracting, transmitting, recieving and listener abstracting.

Newtonian velocity is straight forward vector addition, and a difference is V_a-V_b but in relativity the formula changes; it become (V_a-V_b)/(1 - V_aV_b/c²).

Your formulation implies an ability to compare internal to speaker (intent) to internal to listener (interpretation) without applying the transformation.

Because the comparison must be in the same brain, we must transform "internal to speaker" to "internal to listener"; that transformation is abstracted to listener from the verbal (1) that was transmitted from the speaker to the listener (2) that was abstracted to verbal from internal to speaker (3). There are three steps in the transformation.

The topic formulation leaves out (1), (2), and (3), and in so doing implies that a direct comparison is possible.

Just like using Newtonian mathematics to describe relativistic velocities gives the wrong answer, so does the topic formulation.

If this does not help, then, well ... The Sufi say one cannot tell someone something they are not prepared to hear.

David asked Is it your intent to refute this proposition by attempting to establish impossible standards of validity?

No, I am attempting to point out that the proposition assumes an impossibility. You agree that we cannot directly compare a speaker's intent to a listener's interpretation, but the proposition requires exactly that.

It cannot be done because both are internal to different brains. To get something from one brain to another requires the three steps noted previously - abstracting₁ from brain₁ to verbal, transmission of verbal through a medium, and abstracting₂ from verbal to brain₂.

Encode, transmit-receive, decode.

The listener can compare his or her interpretation to his or her decoded, transmitted, encoded, (speaker's) intent, but he cannot compare his interpretation to the speaker's intent directly.

So he or she cannot seek to achieve similarity of structure between interpretation and intent.
He or she can only seek to achieve similarity of structure between interpretation and decoded, transmitted, encoded, intent.

The problem with this is that "decoded, transmitted, encoded, intent" just "is" interpretation. So he or she is comparing his or her interpretation to his or her interpretation.

By leaving out the transformation from one brain to another, the formulation implies an impossibility. But when the transformation is supplied, it shows that the "comparison" is "degenerate" in that it is comparing something to itself.

I won't expand this to show the solution (again) in this post, as I've already described it.

Overly abstract, inadequate, and false proposition -> endeavoring to achieve similarity of structure between listener interpretation and speaker meaning/intent
Corrected proposition -> endeavoring to achieve similarity of structure between listener interpretation and [listener's abstraction from words (verbal) transmitted that were abstracted by the speaker from the] speaker meaning/intent

David wrote There can be similarity of structure in the communication independent of intent

How? What, to you, is {the|a} structure of communication (that does not leave out any significant general semantics principles)?

Sorry about my previous post. It should say "Thomas wrote"; not David wrote;

Thomas wrote, I would say 'intent of communication' is a higher order abstraction than the communication itself.

If "intent" is a higher order abstraction, then seeking to achieve any kind of "similarity of structure" between it and anything else is seeking to do so at high levels of abstraction. High levels of abstraction move away from the more objective (lower) levels of abstraction.

I agree that, from the point of view of the listener any interperation and inference as to the intent of a speaker is at a higher level of abstraction than just understanding the communication, and that is at a higher level of abstraction than understanding the formulation (the words) that are heard.

Any listener's guess as to the speaker's motive is a high level of abstraction by the listener in response to the speakers words.

From the point of view of the speaker, however, the "intent" is an object level experience for which the speaker abstracts from his experience with words (chooses some words out of many) and speaks (or writes). The object level intent itself, however does not rise without a context. It is a high level abstraction from his history of experiences leading up to the moment before he decides to communicate.

So I agree that intent and interpretation (of a communication) are both high level abstractions - higher than the "communication" itself (pending our resolution of what we would agree "communication" means in terms of structure).

Ben,
"Simplifying" an explanation in a general semantics context by leaving out any reference to abstracting effectivily removes "general semantic" from the explanation. It reverts back to pre-general semantics paradigms.

(1) "I know what you mean." identifies many levels of abstraction. Abstraction is left out. Even what is in two differnt heads is identified. "That which I know" "is" "what you mean".

(2) "I feel comfortable that you would agree with my paraphrase of what I abstracted from your words expressing your meaning, were I to say it." exhibits full general semantics. "I feel comfortable": confidence with room for error; "you would agree": stated as a testable prediction; "my paraphrase": encoding; "what I abstracted": abstraction; "from your words": your abstracting to verbal levels.

If we all spoke with full general semantics, all these principles would be present in each speech utterance. After we learn them, then we can go to shorthand notations by including "quotation marks" and the "semantic bargain" with others whom we assume are versed in general semantics. (3) "I believe I understand what you meant."

(1) is very abstract if it is presumed to represent or be a shorthand for (2). (2) is extensional in that it includes many more points of structure than (1). (3) is a better shortand.

Ben said If I teach you some simple things, well, you likely motor along. - "motor along" without understanding the complexity - oblivious to consciousness of abstracting.

Teaching (1) by being overly simplified denies the learner the opportunity to experience the full complexity of the lower level of abstraction structure of (2). Teaching is not done until (2) is understood and capable of being used.

Simplified teaching merely produces a tourist of the swamp, not a hiker, and certainly not a mentor. See my swamp metaphor.

Ben wrote, As I see it, basically David originally asks if we can use the map-territory analogy not just in describing reality, but also in describing intent--specifically intended communciations, intended messages, intended images, etc.

"Intent" is something internal to people. People can hypothesize, guess, assume, etc., what another person's "intent" is, but that is purely another's abstraction from observing behavior and speech. As such it is like "concepts". Even when somebody tells you what their motive is, you can be sure that that is an abstraction, and that it may not be an accurate representation due to people's less that perfect understanding of themselves as well as the prevalence of "covert" motives.

There is a long history of general semantics (personified) asking us not to use "concept"; to use "formulation" instead. I submit that the same principle applies to "motive" and "interpretation". Tell me in words (pictures, gestures, or other symbolic methods), and I will respond. That is being extensional. Tell me what you want, and I will work on it. Tell me what you understand, and I will endeavor to formulate corrections if I feel the need, and we can respond and reply repeatedly with statements or questions until we each believe we understand, or one of us quits before that happens.

No. This is a straw man: Not even the other person themselves? I never said that. But memory has been repeatedly shown not to be one hundred percent reliable, so you just might have a valid point.

You have two claims in the form of questions, the last of which is the straw man. Then you say it sounds obsurd. Yes the straw man "is" absurd, but the first question is also a straw man, because you are using the word "evaulate". We always evaluate our abstraction of intent from the words that other abstracts in response to their "intent".

When we "evaluate" the words we hear we are doing so at object levels and abstracting to verbal levels. This abstraction/evaluation is what we call our "interpretation" of the speaker's words. The evaluation may include an inference as to the speaker's intent, but it is not the speakers intent itself. My claim all along is that we, as listeners, cannot compare our interpretation directly to the speaker's intent. We can only compare it to our evaluation/abstraction from the speakers words that we heard, that is to say, our interpretation of the speakers words.

But this cannot happen in a single transaction, because we have only one instance of abstraction/evaluation/interpretation. It is not yet a comparison because there are not two abstractions to compare.

By making assertions and/or asking questions we can get more data, hear more speakers words, and perform a second abstraction/evaluation into a second interpretation. Then, and only then, can we compare two of our interpretations of different speakers words. If we continue to do this more times, we can reach a point where we think we have a good model of the speakers "meaning"/"intent". We have a model based on the comparison of multiple listener interpretations (to each other), but we do NOT have a model based on comparing a listener's interpretation to a speaker's intent. We have a hypothetical model of the speaker's intent constructed from the comparison of multiple listener interpretations.

If we get to the point that the original speaker answers as we expect for each question we ask, we may concude that our model is strongly corroborated. There will be structure in the formulations we use in terms of the words and their arrangements. But those are the formulations; they are neither the "internal" listener's "model" representation nor the internal speaker's intent representatation.

I've heard it said that there have been instances of book-long conversations that concluded when the participants finally discovered that they were talking about different things.

The principle of general semantics that applies is "the map is not the territory". The listener's interpretation is not the speaker's intent. The map may be used a long time before errors are discovered. But we do not have much possibilty of comparative evaluation on the basis of coherence based on a single one directional communication; two-way feedback and multiple transactions are required.

Even monozygotic twins have physically different brains programmed differently by the environment through different experiences.

The extensional questions remain unanswered. How can "intent" be measured and distinguished from formulations? How can "interpretation" be measured and distinguished from forumulations?

Thomas wrote, In view of my comments above I think you should not write 'meaning/intent' together with a slash symbol - these are 2 very different things (orders of abstraction).

David was first to use "meaning/intent". That they differ in level of abstractions or otherwise I do not dispute. For my purposes they are both internal to persons, and my arguments would mostly apply equally to both.

The extensional questions remain unanswered. How can "intent" be measured and distinguished from formulations? How can "interpretation" be measured and distinguished from forumulations?

Any "statement" of intent is a formulation.
Any "statement" of interpretation is a formulation.

David wrote,
1. "Memory has been repeatedly shown not to be one hundred percent reliable", and I don't think you correctly remember what you originally meant; therefore, I'm concluding that I really do understand what you meant, you just don't remember correctly.

2. It is widely known that there is a "prevalence of covert motives" in communication between people, and I think that is the case here; therefore, I'm concluding that I really do understand what you meant, and what you are saying now is a cover-up for your real motives.

Although the variations on the formulations and exact wording varies, (1) might happen frequently with Alzheimers patients, and (2) happens frequently with politicians, couples not honest with each other, lawyers, and others. "Justification" would depend on the person and the context.

A disconfirmation of a paraphrase involves a second communication, and that provides a second interpretation that can be compared to the first.

I would conclude that my model (interpretation) was disconfirmed, but I would not conclude anything about "similarity of structure" between my model and anything else. I would only conclude that it's predictive power failed.

It order to conclude "similarity of structure" I must be able to perform two separate abstractions, presumably from different events, and then I would only be able to conclude that the structures of my two interpretations have few enough difference, but because each interpretation is a map, and the map is not the territory, I would not go so far as to infer or conclude that the putative "territories" that my interpetations (semantic reaction) may be said to be "about" also have "few enough differences".

(3) Map₁ <--> Map₂
["=~" means is not.]
Translating (3) using Map is not (=~) Territory yields
(4) =~Territory₁ <--> =~Territory₂.

It is invalid to remove the "=~" from both sides of the above.

Another way of showing this is using mathematics.

Let m(t) represent a map of a territory:

If two interpretations are similar we can represent that as:

m₁(t₁) <--> m₂(t₂)

But this does not allow concluding that the mapping process match nor that the territories match; both would have to be true for us to conclude that t₁ similar to t₂, but both being true would beg the question.

Just as two different maps can be made of one territory, one map can be made that represents two distinct territories (less common, but any time you use the same metaphor to explain two different things you have one map used to represent two different territories).

It is invalid to conclude that maps with similar structure represent territories with similar structure, notwithstanding the fact that one can manipulate the degree of similarity simply by choosing the level of abstraction of observation.

Maps, for me, are for navigating, and it is their predictive power that is useful. I don't know what the territory "is" and I don't assume it has a "structure", because any such "structure" is a projection of the structure of my map or model. But I do like having maps that I use for a long time without a prediction failure. I prefer the term 'theory' because it seems to have a weaker connotation that we "know" the territory by means of the map.

See my On "Similarity of Structure" and non-similar structure.

Ben,
Your post presents the picture from the "God's eye view" perspective.

Ben wrote Let's say I intend to communicate this image in my head: "1+1=2"

An event that the listener does not know anything about yet is occurring within Ben's brain.

Ben Now let's say I say this to a listener: "One plus one equals two."

The listener is noticing some stimuli on his auditory senses.

Ben: Now, let's say the listener hears this utterance, and then interprets what I've said into the phrase "One plus one equals two."

The listener hears some sounds and abstracts them into verbal levels. Let us assume for brevity sake that he heard the words "One plus one equals two."

Ben: Then, let's say the listener translates this phrase into mathematical terms: "1+1=2"

Let's say the listener translates this into "+(01,01)=10" functional notation in binary, as computer techies might do.

Ben: In this example, I would say that the listener's map matched the (my) territory.

Well, Ben, you can stipulate such verbal representations, but they are formulations, and from the perspective of the listener, he has no idea what "image" or "formulation" your object level experience was abstracted to. Moreover, if you are the speaker, you cannot know what formulational representation the listener chooses, let alone what his object level representation is.

By claiming to do so and presenting them as in this sequence, you are presuming that you know everything - the so-called "God's eye view".

Ben: The map-territory analogy holds if you keep the intended message constant.

Holding the intended message constant from speaker to listener (using the "God's eye view") begs the question by presuming the result. It is fallacious reasoning of the type that assumes the desired result.

Ben: If you suggest it slips and slides, the analogy probably doesn't hold.

The map-territory analogy is just an analogy. It's application in any given situation is not absolute; it is limited. Each situation has to be looked at carefully to insure that significant variations from the "pure" map-territory structure are taken into consideration. When it is applied in a communications situation involving abstraction, we must be very careful to make sure that a "third person" perspective is not allowed to "contaminate" the conclusions that can be made from a first person perspective. The third person perspective aka "God's eye view" bypasses the abstraction required in the first person perspective.

David asked, Are you suggesting that in a GS context, it's possible to achieve sufficiency with respect to "similarity of structure" and still not achieve "predictive power"?

No. Not even close. "Similarity of structure" is a red herring unless it is clearly understood as similarity of "projected" structure (external) or similarity of "map" structure, and then only when "projected" by the same projector. Model, or theory, etc., sufficiency of predictabily is not dependent upon "teritorial" similarity of struture, as evidenced by the reliability of our seeing colors consistenty when "colors" have been shown not to exist "in the territory", as well as the fact that multiple different maps can be made of one territory and that multiple territories can be abstracted to one map. The general relation between maps and territories is one of many to many with incompleteness and with "error" as well as with the sense that map and territory characteristics are different.

Example: According to our current time-binding "knowledge", there is no "similarity of structure" between our visual map of colors and the physical territory. When we say it is purple, we are projecting a property of the the visual system that does not have a corresponding external property onto what is going on.

We do not "know" what any physical structure in the event level "is"; we only know what our maps, models, theories, etc., are like.

Our nervous systems are designed by a historical trial and error evolutionary process that selected for predictability of response. If we predict our next experience well, then we can survive when we take appropriate action.

We can have sufficiency of predictability without any "similarity of structure" between map and "territory". Any such hypothesized similary is merely a projection from the response back onto the unknown but responded to territory.

Ben,
There are differences among "God's eye view", "bird's eye view", and "Ben's eye view".
God's eye view does not connote religion in my mind; it only has two primary properties. There is no abstraction loss and no error (all knowing). The God's eye view is the first umpire, but without possibility of error. Describing something from the "God's eye view" is doing so without acknowledging either perspective or abstraction. The "Birds eye view" presumes seeing the big picture "as it is" from above - the second umpire. It allows for perspective, and can be thought of as similar in some way to the "third person" perspective that I speak/write of. "Ben's eye view", however, means the third person with the external recognition that Ben sees things differently. We don't know exactly how he does see things, but he sees them from his experience.

We have theories to explain what we experience. Those theories are often presented as matters of fact which presumes a third person grammatical perspective.

You acknowledge that "intent" and "interpretation" are not "formulations"; I presume you will allow that they may be characterized as some internal-to-brain activities. We cannot see them. We cannot measure them except by the process of abstraction to verbal levels into a formulation that is a statement of intent or a statement of interpretation - made exclusively by the person in whose brain the intent or interpretation resides.

You may hypothesize all you like that IF the formulations have some measurable similarity of structure THEN the supposed intenal process also have some similarity of structure, but this is only a projection; you have no way to prove that the territories are similar; you can only show that the abstraction maps are similar. We still have no idea how an individual "intent" or "interpretation" is represented in a brain any more than we have any idea how a "concept" is represented in a brain. We have vague notions of synaptic facilitation as an overall process, but we cannot map the neural connections in a single living (human) brain let alone do it for any particular intent or interpretation. In my opinion it's ludicrous to assume that something so abstract as similarity of structure can apply when "structure" is an undefined term in general semantics and none can agree to a clear "concept" by either postulation or intuition. That maps in general bear a many to many relation with territories in general makes the foregoing IF ... THEN ... hypothesis doubly suspect.

I know what "similar" means with respect to geometry and triangles, as well as in fuzzy sets. But in the later cases "similar" involves a mapping to an ordered set, usually of numbers, that have the capability of being compared and of determining a "more" or "less" evaluation. In the former case, what characteristics match and what characteristics do not match are exactly specified.

What have you got for "intent" or "interpetation"? Absolutely nothing, because they are internal to brains and you have no access to the internals of any brain other than your own, and in that case you do not have access to the workings; you only have access to the content - the same as I do - like when looking through a telescope, one cannot see the workings of the telescope.

I'm sorry, I just cannot be "realistic" about the formulations you chose to express your point of view (pun intended).

Daffynitions:

Intent: N. An unreliably hypothesized cause for another's behavior, believed to exist in another's brain.
Interpretation: N. An unreliably hypothesize cause for another's behavior, believed to exist in brains.

Structure: N. Sing. Plur. Undefined. Something nobody can know.
Similar: A. Not Identical; Different.; Used with "is"; A is similar to B only if A and B are different.

Identical: A. Impossible. Never happens.